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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

MADELINE DION, *individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,*

Plaintiff,
vs.

OXFORD HOTELS AND RESORTS,
LLC d/b/a THE GODFREY HOTEL
HOLLYWOOD and AMADEUS
HOSPITALITY, INC. d/b/a
TRAVELCLICK,

Defendants.

Case No.: 2:24-cv-6562

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

FOR:

- 1. Violation of the California
Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal.
Penal Code § 631(a)**
- 2. Violation of the California
Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal.
Penal Code § 632**

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

1. Plaintiff Madeline Dion (“Plaintiff”) files this class action complaint on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated (the “Class Members”) against Oxford Hotels and Resorts, LLC d/b/a The Godfrey Hotel Hollywood (“Godfrey”) and Amadeus Hospitality, Inc. d/b/a TravelClick (“TravelClick” and together with Godfrey, “Defendants”). Plaintiff brings this action based upon personal knowledge of the facts pertaining to herself, and on information and belief as to all other matters, by and through the investigation of undersigned counsel.

INTRODUCTION

2. The Godfrey Hotel Hollywood is a boutique hotel owned by Oxford Hotels and Resorts and located in Los Angeles, one block south of Sunset Boulevard, with 220 guestrooms.¹

3. In order to market its services, Godfrey owns and controls a website, <https://www.godfreyhotelhollywood.com/> (the “Website”).

4. TravelClick is a hospitality global provider that provides cloud-based solutions, including an independent and mid-size hotel Central Reservation System and Guest Management Solution, as well as business intelligence and media solutions.²

5. TravelClick’s booking solutions cloud-based platform, located at bookings.travelclick.com (“TravelClick Platform” and, together with the Website, “Web Properties”), is provided to hotels to allow guests to book directly from a hotel website.³

¹ See <https://www.godfreyhotelhollywood.com/>.

² See <https://www.amadeus-hospitality.com/insight/amadeus-completes-acquisition-of-travelclickamadeus-completes-acquisition-of-travelclickamadeus-completes-acquisition-of-travelclick/>.

³ See https://www.hotel-online.com/press_releases/release/travelclick-launches-

1 6. When guests like Plaintiff make reservations on a hotel website that
2 employs the TravelClick Platform, like Godfrey’s Website, guests are redirected
3 to the TravelClick booking Platform which allows those guests to choose the
4 dates of their stay, hotel room and rate, before providing their payment
5 information and completing their reservation.

6 7. However, unbeknownst to them, any guest who books a hotel
7 reservation on Godfrey’s Website, which employs the TravelClick Platform, has
8 their personally identifiable information (“PII”)—including information that
9 identifies them as guests, boarders, occupants, lodgers, customers, or invitees of a
10 hotel—and unlawfully discloses it to third parties including Meta Platforms, Inc.
11 (“Facebook”) and Google, Inc. (“Google”).

12 8. This unlawful disclosure occurs because Defendants installed third-
13 party tracking technologies such as the Meta Pixel (“Facebook Pixel” or “Pixel”)
14 as well as Google Analytics and Google Tag Manager (“Tracking Tools”) onto
15 their Website and/or the TravelClick Platform.

16 9. The Meta Pixel tracks and collects communications with the
17 Defendants via the Website and/or the TravelClick Platform and surreptitiously
18 forces the user’s web browser to send those communications to undisclosed third
19 parties, such as Facebook and/or Google.

20 10. Importantly, alongside the guest information, the Pixel also disclosed
21 Plaintiff’s and Class Members’ personal identifiers, including customers’ IP
22 address and cookie values such as their unique Facebook ID, thereby allowing
23 individual customers’ communications with Defendants, and their guest
24 information contained in those communications, to be linked to their unique
25 Facebook accounts

26
27 [new-responsive-booking-engine-4-0-maximizing/](#).

1 11. Specifically, the Pixel uses cookies to disclose a guest's Facebook
2 ID that is linked to their Facebook profile and contains a wide range of
3 demographic and other information about the guest, including pictures, personal
4 interests, work history, relationship status, and other details. Because the user's
5 Facebook ID uniquely identifies an individual's Facebook account, Facebook can
6 easily use the Facebook ID to quickly and easily locate, access, and view the
7 user's corresponding Facebook profile.

8 12. Similarly, Google "stores users' logged-in identifier on non-Google
9 websites...in its logs ... Whenever a user logs-in on non-Google websites,
10 whether in private browsing mode or non-private browsing mode, the same
11 identifier is associated with the data Google collects from the user's browsing
12 activities on that website. Google further logs all such data (private and non-
13 private) within the same logs and uses these data for serving personalized ads."⁴

14 13. Defendants aid, employ, or otherwise enable a third party, Facebook
15 and/or Google, to eavesdrop on communications sent and received by Plaintiff
16 and Class Members, including communications that contain sensitive and
17 confidential information (i.e., "guest records," as defined by California Civil
18 Code § 53.5).

19 14. By failing to procure consent before enabling Facebook and
20 Google's interception of these communications, Defendants violated the
21 California Invasion of Privacy Act ("CIPA") §§ 631-632.

22
23
24
25 ⁴ See *Brown v. Google LLC*, Case No. 4:20-cv-3664-YGR, 2023 WL 5029899
26 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2023) (order denying summary judgment and citing internal
27 evidence from Google employees).

1 **PARTIES**

2 15. Plaintiff Madeline Dion is, and at all relevant times has been, a
3 resident Los Angeles, California.

4 16. Defendant Oxford Hotels and Resorts, LLC d/b/a The Godfrey Hotel
5 Hollywood is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business and
6 corporate headquarters at 350 W. Hubbard Street, Suite 440, Chicago, IL 60654.

7 17. Defendant Amadeus Hospitality, Inc. d/b/a TravelClick is a
8 Delaware corporation with its principal place of business and corporate
9 headquarters at 75 New Hampshire Avenue, # 300, Portsmouth, NH 03801.

10 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

11 18. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action under 28
12 U.S.C. § 1332(d) because this is a class action wherein the amount in controversy
13 exceeds the sum or value of \$5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, there are
14 more than 100 members in the proposed class, and at least one member of the
15 class is a citizen of a state different from Defendants.

16 19. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they
17 regularly engage in business in the State of California and in the County of Los
18 Angeles, and a substantial portion of the acts and omissions giving rise to
19 Plaintiff's claims occurred in and emanated from this county.

20 20. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) through
21 (d) because: a substantial part of the events giving rise to this action occurred in
22 this District, including the unlawful disclosure of PII that injured Plaintiff and the
23 purported Class Members.

24 **PLAINTIFF ALLEGATIONS**

25 21. On or around September 25, 2021, Plaintiff Dion visited the Web
26 Properties operated by Defendants on the same browser that she used to access
27 Facebook.

1 22. Plaintiff Dion was in California when she visited the Website.

2 23. Plaintiff accessed the Web Properties on her computer and mobile
3 devices.

4 24. Upon accessing the Website, Plaintiff Dion browsed and booked a
5 hotel room at the Godfrey.

6 25. Each of the communications Plaintiff sent to Defendants was
7 intercepted in transit by Facebook—as enabled by Defendants—as well as by
8 Google, including communications that contained Plaintiff Dion’s confidential
9 “guest records,” as defined by Cal. Civil Code § 53.5.1.

10 26. Neither Defendants nor Facebook or Google procured Plaintiff
11 Dion’s consent prior to this interception and/or disclosure.

12 27. Plaintiff, in using the Web Properties, provided her PII and
13 information regarding her “guest record” including her name, her destination, the
14 dates of her stay, the type of room she stayed in, and the rate of that room.
15 Defendants also transmitted Plaintiff’s Facebook ID, computer IP address and
16 other device and unique online identifiers to Facebook and Google.

17 28. Plaintiff has used and continues to use the same devices to maintain
18 and access an active Facebook account throughout the relevant period in this case.

19 29. Plaintiff and Class Members has suffered injury as a result of
20 Defendants’ conduct. These injuries include (i) invasion of privacy, (ii) loss of the
21 benefit of the bargain, (iii) diminution of value of the disclosed Private
22 Information, (iv) statutory damages, (v) mental distress, and (vi) the continued and
23 ongoing risk of further disclosure of their Private Information.

24 **COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS**

25 **I. The California Invasion of Privacy Act**

26 30. The California Legislature enacted the Invasion of Privacy Act to
27 protect certain privacy rights of California citizens. The legislature expressly
28

1 recognized that “the development of new devices and techniques for the purpose
2 of eavesdropping upon private communications ... has created a serious threat to
3 the free exercise of personal liberties and cannot be tolerated in a free and
4 civilized society.” Cal. Penal Code § 630.

5 31. The California Supreme Court has repeatedly stated an “express
6 objective” of CIPA is to “protect a person placing or receiving a call from a
7 situation where the person on the other end of the line *permits an outsider to tap*
8 *his telephone or listen in on the call.*” *Ribas v. Clark*, 38 Cal. 3d 355, 364 (1985)
9 (emphasis added).

10 32. Further, as the California Supreme Court has held in explaining the
11 legislative purpose behind CIPA:

12 While one who imparts private information risks the
13 betrayal of his confidence by the other party, a
14 substantial distinction has been recognized between the
15 secondhand repetition of the contents of a conversation
16 and its simultaneous dissemination to an unannounced
17 second auditor, whether that auditor be a person or
18 mechanical device.

16 As one commentator has noted, such secret monitoring
17 denies the speaker an important aspect of privacy of
18 communication—the right to control the nature and
19 extent of the firsthand dissemination of his statements.

Id. at 360-61 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

20 33. As part of CIPA, the California Legislature enacted § 631(a), which
21 prohibits any person or entity from [i] “intentionally tap[ping], or mak[ing] any
22 unauthorized connection ... with any telegraph or telephone wire,” [ii] “willfully
23 and without the consent of all parties to the communication ... read[ing], or
24 attempt[ing] to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any ... communication
25 while the same is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is being
26 sent from, or received at any place within [California],” or [iii] “us[ing], or
27 attempt[ing] to use ... any information so obtained.”
28

1 34. CIPA § 631(a) also penalizes [iv] those who “aid[], agree[]
2 with, employ[], or conspire[] with any person” who conducts the
3 aforementioned wiretapping, or those who “permit” the wiretapping.

4 35. As part of CIPA, the California Legislature additionally introduced
5 Penal Code § 632(a), which prohibits any person or entity from “intentionally and
6 without the consent of all parties to a confidential communication, us[ing] an
7 electronic amplifying or recording device to eavesdrop upon or record [a]
8 confidential communication.”

9 36. A “confidential communication” for the purposes of CIPA §
10 632 is “any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably
11 indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the
12 parties thereto.” Cal. Penal Code § 632(c).

13 37. Individuals may bring an action against the violator of CIPA §§ 631
14 and 632 for \$5,000 per violation. Cal. Penal Code § 637.2(a)(1). Plaintiff does so,
15 here, against Defendants.

16 **II. California Civil Code § 53.5**

17 38. As the California Legislature recognized, a “guest record”
18 maintained by an owner or operator of an inn, hotel, motel, lodging house, or
19 other similar accommodations is confidential. Such an owner or operator “shall
20 not disclose, produce, provide, release, transfer, disseminate, or otherwise
21 communicate, except to a California peace officer, all or any part of a guest
22 record orally, in writing, or by electronic or any other means to a third party
23 without a court-issued subpoena, warrant, or order.” Cal. Civil Code § 53.5(a).

24 39. Per Cal. Civil Code § 53.5(c):

25 “Guest record” for purposes of this section includes any
26 record that identifies an individual guest, boarder,
27 occupant, lodger, customer, or invitee, including, but not
28 limited to, their name, social security number or other
unique identifying number, date of birth, location of

1 birth, address, telephone number, driver's license
2 number, other official form of identification, credit card
3 number, or automobile license plate number.

40. Further, the legislative history of § 53.5 indicates:

(a) In 1972, California voters amended the California
4 Constitution to include the right of privacy among the
5 "inalienable" rights of all people. The amendment
6 established a legal and enforceable right of privacy for
7 every Californian. Fundamental to this right of privacy is
8 the ability of individuals to control the use of their
9 personal information.

(b) Since California voters approved the right of privacy,
10 the California Legislature has adopted specific
11 mechanisms to safeguard consumer privacy, including
12 the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, the Online
13 Privacy Protection Act, the Reader Privacy Act, the
14 Privacy Rights for California Minors in the Digital World
15 Act, and Shine the Light, a California law intended to
16 give Californians the 'who, what, where, and when' of
17 how businesses handle consumers' personal information.

(c) Californians frequently have to disclose their sensitive
18 personal information to third parties in order to
19 accomplish routine activities: apply for a job; apply for
20 housing; raise a child; drive a car or take transportation;
21 or stay at a hotel or motel.

(d) California law has not kept pace with these
22 developments and the personal privacy implications
23 surrounding the collection, use, and protection of
24 personal information by third parties.

(e) Many businesses collect personal information from
25 California consumers. They may know where a consumer
26 lives, how many children a consumer has, where a
27 consumer lives and works, where a consumer travels and
28 where they stay on their trip, how fast a consumer drives,
a consumer's personality, sleep habits, biometric and
health information, financial information, precise
geolocation information, and social networks, to name a
few categories.

(f) The unauthorized disclosure of personal information
and the loss of privacy can have devastating effects for
individuals, including financial fraud, identity theft,
unnecessary costs to personal time and finances,
destruction of property, harassment, reputational damage,
emotional stress, and even potential physical harm.

(g) When Californians leave their homes to travel via bus
or stay at lodging establishments throughout their state,
they desire assurances that these businesses will respect

1 their privacy and safeguard their personal information
2 from improper disclosure.

3 (h) Protecting the privacy of personal information
4 promotes consumer confidence and encourages both
5 residents and visitors to travel to and within California
6 and to patronize California businesses.

7 (i) Therefore, it is the intent of the Legislature to further
8 Californians' right to privacy by ensuring that the
9 personal information disclosed by patrons of lodging
10 establishments and bus companies is used for the
11 intended business purposes and not improperly disclosed.

12 California S.B. 1194 (September 27, 2018).⁵

13 41. Here, users' communications with Defendants—made while browsing
14 and booking via the Web Properties—contain sensitive and confidential “guest
15 records,” as defined by Cal. Civil Code § 53.5.

16 42. The communications include “record[s] that identif[y] an
17 individual[.]” Cal. Civil Code § 53.5(c).

18 43. The Facebook Pixel compels Web Properties users' browsers to
19 transmit cookies (including the c_user, datr, fr, and _fbp cookies) containing
20 “unique identifying number[s]” assigned to users of the Web Properties. Cal.
21 Civil Code § 53.5(c). These communications are all “record[s] that identif[y] an
22 individual[.]” Cal. Civil Code § 53.5(c).

23 44. Similar to Facebook, information sent to Google was sent alongside
24 the Plaintiff's and Class Members' unique identifier (“_ga” or “CID” cookies) ,
25 thereby allowing individual customers' communications with Defendants, and the
26 Private Information contained in those communications, to be linked to their
27 unique Google accounts and therefore their identity.

28 ⁵https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB1194.

1
2 **III. Defendant's Tracking Tools, as Enabled by Defendants, Wiretaps Californians' Communications, in Violation of CIPA**

3 **A. Overview of Facebook's Advertising Platform and the Facebook Pixel**

4 45. Facebook refers to itself as a "real identify platform,"⁶ meaning users
5 are allowed only one account and must share "the name they go by in everyday
6 life."⁷ To that end, when creating an account, users must provide their first and
7 last name, along with their birthday and gender.⁸

8 46. As recently as 2021, Facebook generated over \$100 billion in annual
9 revenue.⁹ Roughly 97% of that came from selling advertising space.¹⁰

10 47. Facebook sells advertising space by highlighting its ability to target
11 users.¹¹ Facebook can target users so effectively because it surveils user activity
12 both on and off its site.¹² This allows Facebook to make inferences about users
13 beyond what they explicitly disclose, like their "interests," "behaviors," and
14 "demographics."¹³ Facebook compiles this information into generalized dataset

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16 ⁶ Sam Schechner and Jeff Horwitz, *How Many Users Does Facebook Have? The Company Struggles to Figure It Out*, WALL. ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2021).

17 ⁷ FACEBOOK, COMMUNITY STANDARDS: ACCOUNT INTEGRITY
18 AND AUTHENTIC IDENTITY, <https://transparency.meta.com/policies/community-standards/account-integrity-and-authentic-identity/>.

19 ⁸ FACEBOOK, SIGN UP, <https://www.facebook.com/signup>.

20 ⁹ FACEBOOK, META REPORTS FOURTH QUARTER AND FULL YEAR
21 2021 RESULTS, <https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-release-details/2022/Meta-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-%2022Full-Year-2021-Results/default.aspx>.

22 ¹⁰ *Id.*

23 ¹¹ FACEBOOK, WHY ADVERTISE ON FACEBOOK,
24 <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/205029060038706>.

25 ¹² FACEBOOK, ABOUT META PIXEL,
26 <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/742478679120153?id=1205376682832142>.

27 ¹³ FACEBOOK, AUDIENCE AD TARGETING,
28 <https://www.facebook.com/business/ads/ad-targeting>.

1 called “Core Audiences,” which advertisers use to apply highly specific filters
2 and parameters for their targeted advertisements.¹⁴

3 48. Advertisers can build “Custom Audiences.”¹⁵ Custom Audiences
4 enables advertisers to reach “people who have already shown interest in [their]
5 business, whether they’re loyal customers or people who have used [their] app or
6 visited [their] website.”¹⁶ With Custom Audiences, advertisers can target existing
7 customers directly, and can also build “Lookalike Audiences,” which “leverage[]
8 information such as demographics, interests, and behavior from your source
9 audience and find new people who share similar qualities.”¹⁷

10 49. Unlike Core Audiences, advertisers can build Custom Audiences and
11 Lookalike Audiences only if they first supply Facebook with the underlying data.
12 They can do so through two mechanisms: by manually uploading contact
13 information for customers, or by utilizing Facebook’s “Business Tools,”¹⁸
14 including the Facebook Pixel, as described *supra*.

15 50. As Facebook puts it, the Business Tools “help website owners and

16 ¹⁴ FACEBOOK, EASIER, MORE EFFECTIVE WAYS TO REACH THE RIGHT
17 PEOPLE ON FACEBOOK, [https://www.facebook.com/business/news/Core-](https://www.facebook.com/business/news/Core-Audiences)
18 [Audiences](https://www.facebook.com/business/news/Core-Audiences).

19 ¹⁵ FACEBOOK, ABOUT CUSTOM AUDIENCES,
20 [https://www.facebook.com/business/help/744354708981227?id=24690979533764](https://www.facebook.com/business/help/744354708981227?id=2469097953376494)
21 [94](https://www.facebook.com/business/help/744354708981227?id=2469097953376494).

22 ¹⁶ FACEBOOK, AD TARGETING, HELP YOUR ADS FIND THE PEOPLE
23 WHO WILL LOVE YOUR BUSINESS,
24 <https://www.facebook.com/business/ads/ad-targeting>.

25 ¹⁷ FACEBOOK, About Lookalike Audiences,
26 [https://www.facebook.com/business/help/164749007013531?id=40166839044232](https://www.facebook.com/business/help/164749007013531?id=401668390442328)
27 [8](https://www.facebook.com/business/help/164749007013531?id=401668390442328).

28 ¹⁸ FACEBOOK, CREATE A CUSTOMER LIST CUSTOM AUDIENCE,
<https://www.facebook.com/business/help/17045684314556>; FACEBOOK,
CREATE A WEBSITE CUSTOM AUDIENCE,
[https://www.facebook.com/business/help/1474662202748341?id=2469097953376](https://www.facebook.com/business/help/1474662202748341?id=2469097953376494)
[494](https://www.facebook.com/business/help/1474662202748341?id=2469097953376494).

1 publishers, app developers and business partners, including advertisers and
2 others, integrate with Meta, understand and measure their products and services,
3 and better reach and serve people who might be interested in their products and
4 services.”¹⁹

5 51. Put succinctly, Facebook’s Business Tools are bits of code that
6 advertisers can integrate into their website, mobile applications, and servers,
7 thereby enabling Facebook to intercept and collect user activity on those
8 platforms.

9 52. The Business Tools are configured to capture certain data, like when
10 a user visits a webpage, that webpage’s Universal Resource Locator (“URL”) and
11 metadata, or when a user makes a purchase.²⁰ However, Facebook’s Business
12 Tools can also track other events.

13 53. Facebook offers a menu of “standard events” from which advertisers
14 can choose, including what content a visitor views or purchases.²¹ Advertisers can
15 even create their own tracking parameters by building a “custom event.”²²

16 54. One such Business Tool is the Facebook Pixel. Facebook offers this
17 piece of code to advertisers, like Defendants, to integrate into their websites.

18 55. As the name implies, the Facebook Pixel “tracks the people and the
19 types of actions they take.”²³ When a user accesses a website hosting the
20 Facebook Pixel, Facebook’s software surreptitiously directs the user’s browser to
21 simultaneously send a separate message to Facebook’s servers. This second,
22 secret transmission contains the original GET request sent to the host website,
23 along with additional data that the Pixel is configured to collect. This
24 transmission is initiated by Facebook code and concurrent with the
25 communications with the host website. Two sets of code are thus automatically

26 ¹⁹ FACEBOOK, THE FACEBOOK BUSINESS TOOLS,
27 <https://www.facebook.com/help/331509497253087>.

1 run as part of the browser's attempt to load and a website: the website's own
2 code, and Facebook's embedded code.

3 56. An individual who navigates to the Web Properties and clicks on a
4 button to browse Defendants' offerings sends a GET request to Defendants'
5 server requesting that server to load the particular webpage.

6 57. Because Defendants utilize the Facebook Pixel, Facebook's
7 embedded code, written in JavaScript, sends instructions back to the individual's
8 browser, without alerting the individual that this is happening. Facebook causes
9 the browser to secretly and simultaneously duplicate the communication with
10 Defendants, transmitting it to Facebook's servers alongside additional
11 information that transcribes the communication's content and the individual's
12 identity. This entire process occurs within milliseconds.

13 58. When a user communicates with Defendants' Web Properties, those
14 communications are simultaneously and contemporaneously duplicated and sent
15 to Facebook at the same time as they are sent to Defendants. Thus, Facebook's
16 interception of these communications occurs "in transit." *See, e.g., In re*
17

18 ²⁰ *See* FACEBOOK, META PIXEL GUIDE: ADVANCED,
19 <https://developepers.facebook.com/docs/facebook-pixel/advanced/>; *see also*
20 FACEBOOK, BEST PRACTICES FOR FACEBOOK PIXEL SETUP,
21 [https://www.facebook.com/business/help/218844828315224?id=12053766828321](https://www.facebook.com/business/help/218844828315224?id=1205376682832142%3B)
22 [42%3B](https://www.facebook.com/business/help/218844828315224?id=1205376682832142%3B); FACEBOOK, APP EVENTS API,
23 <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/marketing-api/app-event-api/>.

24 ²¹ FACEBOOK, SPECIFICATIONS FOR FACEBOOK PIXEL STANDARD
25 EVENTS,
26 [https://www.facebook.com/business/help/402791146561655?id=12053766828321](https://www.facebook.com/business/help/402791146561655?id=1205376682832142)
27 [42](https://www.facebook.com/business/help/402791146561655?id=1205376682832142).

28 ²² FACEBOOK, ABOUT STANDARD AND CUSTOM WEBSITE EVENTS,
29 [https://www.facebook.com/business/help/964258670337005?id=12053766828321](https://www.facebook.com/business/help/964258670337005?id=1205376682832142%3B)
30 [42%3B](https://www.facebook.com/business/help/964258670337005?id=1205376682832142%3B).

31 ²³ FACEBOOK, RETARGETING,
32 <https://www.facebook.com/business/goals/retargeting>.

1 *Facebook Internet Tracking Litig.*, 956 F.3d 4 589, 608 (9th Cir. 2020)
2 (“Permitting an entity to engage in the unauthorized duplication and forwarding
3 of unknowing users’ information would render permissible the most common
4 methods of intrusion...”).

5 59. After collecting and intercepting this information, Facebook
6 processes it, analyzes it, and assimilates it into datasets like Core Audiences and
7 Custom Audiences.

8 60. Facebook’s other Business Tools function the same. For mobile
9 applications, advertisers can utilize the Facebook SDK, which contains
10 components like the App Events API, allowing advertisers to track events on their
11 mobile apps so they can “measure ad performance and build audiences for ad
12 targeting.”²⁴

13 61. Advertisers can also utilize the Facebook Business Tool called
14 “Conversions API.” Rather than tracking users using Pixels that rely on cookies
15 (via browser Pixel events), the Conversions API enables tracking directly through
16 advertisers’ website servers (via server events).²⁵ Thus, the Conversions API’s
17 tracking capabilities are not impacted by a consumer’s browser setting, cookies
18 opt-outs, or device-specific privacy controls.²⁶

21 ²⁴ FACEBOOK, APP EVENTS API,
22 <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/marketing-api/app-event-api/>.

23 ²⁵ FACEBOOK, CONVERSIONS API,
24 <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/marketing-api/conversions-api/> (“The
25 Conversions API is designed to create a connection between an advertiser’s
26 marketing data . . . from an advertiser’s server, website platform, mobile app, or
27 CRM to Meta systems[.]”).

28 ²⁶ TUEROIS, DECODING CONVERSIONS API AND PRIVACY
IMPLICATIONS, <https://tueoris.com/privacy/decoding-conversions-api-and-privacy-implications/>.

62. Additionally, the Conversions API collects “customer information parameters sent with [] server event[s]”²⁷ so that those server events data points may be “matched to users”²⁸—including “people who are more likely to take the action [advertisers] care about[.]”²⁹

63. When the Conversion API collects “[s]erver events,” those data points are “linked to a dataset ID and are processed like events sent using the Meta Pixel[.]”³⁰ As with the Facebook Pixel, the Conversions API intercepts those communications contemporaneously and surreptitiously.³¹ Facebook “recommend[s] that advertisers implement the Conversion API alongside their Meta Pixel.”³²

64. Facebook confirms, in its “Meta Business Tools Terms,”³³ that it has the capability to use information it collects for purposes other than recording it and conveying it to Defendants. For instance, Facebook can use the information it collects “to promote safety and security on and off the Meta Products, for research and development purposes and to maintain the integrity of and to

²⁷ FACEBOOK, BEST PRACTICES FOR CONVERSION API, <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/308855623839366?id=818859032317965>.

²⁸ FACEBOOK, CONVERSIONS API: VERIFYING YOUR SETUP, <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/marketing-api/conversions-api/verifying-setup>.

²⁹ FACEBOOK, ABOUT EVENT MATCH QUALITY, <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/765081237991954?id=818859032317965>.

³⁰ FACEBOOK, CONVERSIONS API, <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/marketing-api/conversions-api>.

³¹ FACEBOOK, CONVERSIONS API END-TO-END IMPLEMENTATION, <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/marketing-api/conversions-api/guides/end-to-end-implementation/> (“send events in real time . . . via the Conversions API”).

³² *Id.*

³³ FACEBOOK, META BUSINESS TOOLS TERMS, https://www.facebook.com/legal/businesstech?_rdr.

1 provide and improve the Meta Products.” In other words, Facebook can use the
2 wiretapped information for its own “research and development,” and well as to
3 “protect” its own products and services.

4 65. Facebook can also connect all information it collects to analyze and
5 generate reports regarding advertising campaigns, create custom audience sets
6 that can be shared with other advertisers, and “use your Event Data for ads
7 delivery only after aggregating such Event Data with other data collected from
8 other advertisers or otherwise collected on Meta Products.”³⁴

9 66. Further, Facebook can use the event data to help websites like
10 Defendants’ “reach people with transactional and other commercial messages on
11 [Facebook] Messengers and other Meta Products.”³⁵

12 67. Finally, Facebook can use the information it collects “to personalize
13 the features and content (including ads and recommendations) that we show
14 people on and off our Meta Products.”³⁶

15 68. Thus, Facebook has the capability to use the information it wiretaps
16 for purposes other than simply providing a recording to Defendants, including but
17 not limited to its own contact information matching; measurement and analytics
18 services; ad targeting; commercial and transactional messages; ad delivery
19 improvement; feature and content personalization; and product improvement,
20 provision, and securement.

21 **B. Facebook, As Enabled By Defendants, Intercepts Californians’**
22 **Communications**

23 69. Defendant Godfrey owns and, together with Defendant TravelClick,
24 operates the Website which utilizes the TravelClick booking Platform.

25 ³⁴ *Id.*

26 ³⁵ *Id.*

27 ³⁶ *Id.*

1 Defendants have integrated the Facebook Pixel into these Web Properties.

2 70. On the Web Properties, users can browse and book a reservation at
3 the Godfrey and in doing so, those users are required to provide Defendants with
4 confidential information including “guest information” identifying users of the
5 Web Properties as guests of the hotel, disclosing the dates of their stay, the type
6 of room they book, the number of guests, and other protected information.

7 71. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff and Class Members, however, Defendants
8 aid, agree with, employ, or otherwise enable Facebook to eavesdrop on those
9 confidential communications using Facebook’s Business Tools such as the Pixel
10 and Conversions API.

11 72. Users’ confidential communications are the product of Web
12 Properties users affirmatively entering, and interacting with, information on the
13 Web Properties (*i.e.*, the confidential communications are not procedurally or
14 automatically generated). Instead, as set out below, the confidential
15 communications stem from Web Properties users typing into data fields,
16 conveying responses to questions and prompts, and actively making other
17 selections. All of the foregoing is information created through the intent of
18 Website users: information created by and in response to Web Properties users’
19 communicative inputs; information created by and in response to Web Properties
20 users’ intended messages to the Web Properties and Defendants; and information
21 created by and in response to Web Properties users’ having conveyed and
22 expressed their respective desires that the Web Properties would supply them
23 with certain, highly personalized, types of information and/or responses.

24 73. When a user browses and books a hotel room at the Godfrey Hotel
25 Hollywood on the Web Properties, they select the destination to which they wish
26 to travel, the desired dates for their trip, the number of rooms they require, and
27 the number of adults and children who will be traveling. Facebook, as enabled by
28

Defendants, contemporaneously intercepts a Web Properties user's button clicks selecting such items—using the Facebook Pixel:

THE GODFREY
HOTEL HOLLYWOOD

Your Reservation Details
[View / Modify](#)

[Add More Rooms](#)

July Special

Your Reservation

Deal: BEST AVAILABLE RATE ⓘ
FREE UPGRADE

Partial Accessible King with Tub - 1 room
1 night 2 adults
Tue, Jul 16, 2024

Subtotal

Taxes
Amenity Fee
Total

[View Tax Breakdown](#)

Special Requests:
Note: These are not guaranteed.
Arrival Time:

\$ 245.00
\$ 245.00
\$ 245.00
\$ 39.81
\$ 38.32
\$ 323.13

X Headers Payload Preview Response Initiator Timing Cookies

▼Query String Parameters view source view URL-encoded

id: 391474022466070

ev: InitiateCheckout

dl: https://bookings.travelclick.com/104015?_ga=2.198624038.86808335.1720406407-1132846831.1720236930&domain=www.godfreyhotelhollywood.com&RoomTypeID=462623#/total

rl: https://www.godfreyhotelhollywood.com/

if: false

ts: 1720406708310

cd[content_type]: hotel

cd[checkin_date]: 2024-07-16

cd[checkout_date]: 2024-07-17

cd[custom_param13]: The+Godfrey+Hotel+Hollywood

cd[custom_param7]: 1

cd[custom_param8]: Partial+Accessible+King+with+Tub

cd[content_ids]: ["104015"]

cd[custom_param6]: 1

cd[value]: 245


cd[purchase_value]: 245

74. As shown by the highlights in this excerpt of the Website's transmissions, beginning at the top, Defendants configured the Facebook Pixel number 391474022466070 to disclose, via the "InitiateCheckout" event, the specific details of users' confidential "guest records."

75. The Pixel discloses the previous webpage ("https://godfreyhotelhollywood.com), the Check-in date (2024-07-16), the Check-out date (2024-07-17), the destination (The Godfrey Hotel Hollywood), the room type (Partial Accessible King with Tub) and even the purchase value (\$245).

76. Defendants disclose to Facebook a number of events, sharing the details of a guest's interactions with the Web Properties as they progress through the process of booking and purchasing a hotel room, including the "SubscribedButtonClick" event which discloses when users "click on something the pixel detects as a button or link[,]" along with "the button or link's text."³⁷

77. Through this event, Facebook intercepts the destination (the Godfrey), the date of the trip, the number of adults, the number of children, and the fact that the guest clicked the "book" button and booked the room.



³⁷ HACKERNOON, HOW TO FIX YOUR ORGANIZATION'S META PIXEL PROBLEM, <https://hackernoon.com/how-to-fix-your-organizations-meta-pixel-problem>.

78. As the guest progresses through the booking process, Defendants allow Facebook to intercept the details of the users’ “guest records,” using the “Purchase” event to confirm a guest’s purchase of the hotel room:

```
▼Query String Parameters    view source    view URL-encoded
id: 391474022466070
ev: Purchase
dl: https://bookings.travelclick.com/104015?_ga=2.168813352.86808335.1720406407-1132846831.1720236930&Adults=1&DateIn=08/13/2024&DateOut=08/14/2024&domain=www.godfreyhotelhollywood.com&hotelId=104015&languageid=1&Rooms=1#/confirmation
rl: https://www.godfreyhotelhollywood.com/
if: false
ts: 1720531546798
cd[content_type]: hotel
cd[checkin_date]: 2024-08-13
cd[checkout_date]: 2024-08-14
cd[custom_param13]: The Godfrey Hotel Hollywood
cd[custom_param7]: 1
cd[custom_param8]: King
cd[content_ids]: ["104015"]
cd[custom_param6]: 1
cd[value]: 242.25
cd[purchase_value]: 242.25
```

79. Along with disclosing that the room had been purchased, the “Purchase” event also discloses the destination, how many rooms were booked, how many adults were in the room, the check in and check out dates, the type of room and how much the room cost. These events allowed Facebook to track a guest’s interactions with the Web Properties from the initiation of the reservation all the way through the purchase of the room.

C. Defendants Enable Facebook to Pair Event Data with a User’s Identity

80. Along with the foregoing, Facebook Pixels—as enabled by Defendants—pair event data with a user’s Facebook ID. Facebook does this through cookies.

81. A cookie is a “small text file (up to 4KB) created by a website that is stored in the user's computer either temporarily for that session only or

permanently in storage (persistent cookie).”³⁸ Among other things, persistent cookies can be used to “track user behavior across different sites. They store information such as geographic location, device specifications, and specific actions taken on the website.”³⁹

82. Facebook “place[s] cookies on [a person’s] computer or device and receive[s] information stored in [those] cookies when [said person] use[s] or visit[s]: [] Meta Products [(i.e., Facebook, Messenger, Instagram, etc.); [and] Products provided by other members of the Meta Companies; and Websites and apps provided by other companies that use the Meta Products, including companies that incorporate Meta technologies [(i.e., the Facebook Business Tools)] into their websites and apps.”⁴⁰

83. Thus, in short, Facebook places cookies on a user’s computer that allow Facebook to follow a user’s surfing behavior across other websites which have implemented a Facebook Pixel or other Facebook component.⁴¹

Request Cookies ☐ show filtered out request cookies

Name ▲	Value	Domain	Path	Ex...	Size	Http...	Sec...	Sa...	Par...
c_user	61560564045991	.facebook.com	/	20...	20		✓	No...	
datr	h9WCZnuMq3rUaBLLpzn...	.facebook.com	/	20...	28	✓	✓	No...	
dpr	1.5	.facebook.com	/	20...	6		✓	No...	
fr	16NLeDjiT6Y9ZNT2k.AWW7...	.facebook.com	/	20...	82	✓	✓	No...	
locale	en_US	.facebook.com	/	20...	11		✓	No...	
ps_n	1	.facebook.com	/	20...	5	✓	✓	No...	
sb	h9WCZqatviXVCm_wXMDL4...	.facebook.com	/	20...	26	✓	✓	No...	
xs	37%3APDHxTI5Wsp3gYg%3...	.facebook.com	/	20...	96	✓	✓	No...	

³⁸ PC MAGAZINE, COOKIE, <https://pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/cookie>.

³⁹ COOKIEBOT, WHAT ARE TRACKING COOKIES AND HOW DO THEY WORK?, <https://www.cookiebot.com/en/tracking-cookies/>.

⁴⁰ FACEBOOK, COOKIES & OTHER STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES, <https://www.facebook.com/privacy/policy/>.

⁴¹ See, e.g., Paschalis Bekos et al., *The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Facebook Web Tracking with Invisible Pixels and Click IDs* (Apr. 2023) <https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3543507.3583311>.

84. When a user accesses the Web Properties while logged into Facebook, the Pixel will compel that user's browser to transmit several cookies, including the c_user, datr, and fr cookies:⁴²

85. The c_user cookie contains, at least, the user's unencrypted Facebook ID.⁴³ The c_user cookie has a lifespan four hundred days.⁴⁴

86. The datr cookie contains, at least, a value that uniquely identifies a browser.⁴⁵ The datr cookie has a lifespan of four hundred days.⁴⁶

87. The fr cookies contains, at least, a value that uniquely identifies a browser and the user's encrypted Facebook ID.⁴⁷ The fr has a lifespan of ninety days.⁴⁸

⁴² Note that the Facebook Pixel uses both first- and third-party cookies. A first-party cookie is "created by the website the user is visiting"—i.e., the Website. PC MAGAZINE, FIRST-PARTY COOKIE, <https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/first-party-cookie>. A third-party cookie is "created by a website with a domain name other than the one the user is currently visiting"—i.e., Facebook. PC MAGAZINE, THIRD-PARTY COOKIE, <https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/third-party-cookie>. The _fbp cookie is always transmitted as a first-party cookie. A duplicate _fbp cookie is sometimes sent as a third-party cookie, depending on whether the browser has recently logged into Facebook. Pictured here is the _fbp cookie, sent as a first-party cookie.

⁴³ MICROSOFT, COOKIE COMPLIANCE, <https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dynamics365/commerce/cookie-compliance> ("Cookie[:] c_user[.] Description[:] Cookie contains the user ID of the currently signed-in user.").

⁴⁴ FACEBOOK, COOKIES & OTHER STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES, <https://www.facebook.com/policy/cookies/>.

⁴⁵ *Id.* ("Datr' is a unique identifier for your browser[.]").

⁴⁶ *Id.*

⁴⁷ DATA PROTECTION COMMISSIONER, FACEBOOK IRELAND LTD, REPORT OF RE-AUDIT (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.europe-v-facebook.org/ODPC_Review.pdf ("The first part of the cookie is a browser ID, used to identify the web browser. The second part of the cookie is an encrypted version of the logged in user's Facebook ID.").

⁴⁸ FACEBOOK, COOKIES & OTHER STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES, <https://www.facebook.com/policy/cookies/>.

1 88. When a website visitor's browser has recently logged out of an
2 account, Facebook compels the visitor's browser to send a smaller set of cookies
3 including datr, and fr cookies. No matter the circumstances, Facebook compels
4 the visitor's browser to transmit the fr and _fbp cookies:

5 89. Facebook, at a minimum, uses c_user, datr, and fr cookies to link
6 Facebook IDs and corresponding Facebook profiles and identity of users.⁴⁹
7 Facebook, itself, explains that these, and/or other "customer information
8 parameters[,] are ultimately "matched to Meta accounts."⁵⁰ In this way, the
9 "cookie[s] identif[y] browsers for the purposes of providing advertising and site
10 analytics services[.]"⁵¹

11 www.facebook.com

12 GET

13 /tr/?

14 id=391474022466070&ev=Purchase&dl=https%3A%2F%2Fbookings.travelclick.com%2F104015%
15 3F_ga%3D2.168813352.86808335.1720406407-

16 1132846831.1720236930%26Adults%3D1%26DateIn%3D08%2F13%2F2024%26DateOut%3D08%
17 2F14%2F2024%26domain%3Dwww.godfreyhotelhollywood.com%26hotelId%3D104015%26langu
18 ageid%3D1%26Rooms%3D1%23%2Fconfirmation&rl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.godfreyhotelhollyw
19 ood.com%2F&if=false&ts=1720531546798&cd[content_type]=hotel&cd[checkin_date]=2024-08-
20 13&cd[checkout_date]=2024-08-

21 14&cd[custom_param13]=The%20Godfrey%20Hotel%20Hollywood&cd[custom_param7]=1&cd[c
22 ustom_param8]=King&cd[content_ids]=%5B%22104015%22%5D&cd[custom_param6]=1&cd[val
23 ue]=242.25&cd[purchase_value]=242.25&cd[currency]=&cd[purchase_currency]=&cd[custom_pa
24 ram2]=892562860&cd[custom_param9]=undefined&cd[custom_param1]=&sw=1600&sh=1067&
v=2.9.160&r=stable&ec=14&o=4126&fbp=fb.1.1720237192253.792968880823719468&ler=othe
r&it=1720530752826&coo=false&tm=2&cdl=&rqm=GET

https

image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,image/svg+xml,image/*;*/;q=0.8

gzip, deflate, br, zstd

en-US,en;q=0.9

sb=h9WCZqatviXVCm_wXMDL42Jl; datr=h9WCZnuMq3rUaBLlpzpNnivS; ps_n=1; dpr=1.5;

c_user=61560564045991;

25 ⁴⁹ *Id.*

26 ⁵⁰ FACEBOOK, ABOUT EVENT MATCH QUALITY,
27 <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/765081237991954>.

28 ⁵¹ FACEBOOK, COOKIES POLICY, <https://www.facebook.com/policy/cookies/>.

1 90. As the screenshot above demonstrates, Defendants’ Pixel sent the
2 user’s communications, and the guest records contained therein, alongside the
3 user’s Facebook ID (the “c_user” highlighted on the last line in the image above),
4 thereby allowing the user’s communications and actions on the website to be
5 linked to their specific Facebook profile.

6 91. A user’s Facebook ID is linked to their Facebook profile, which
7 generally contains a wide range of demographic and other information about the
8 user, including pictures, personal interests, work history, relationship status, and
9 other details. Because the user’s Facebook ID uniquely identifies an individual’s
10 Facebook account, Facebook—or any ordinary person—can easily use the
11 Facebook Profile ID to quickly and easily locate, access, and view the user’s
12 corresponding Facebook profile. To find the Facebook account associated with a
13 c_user cookie, one simply needs to type www.facebook.com/ followed by the
14 c_user ID numeric value.


15 92. These cookies are used to pair event data with personally identifiable
16 information so that companies can later retarget consumers on Facebook.

17 93. Defendants knowingly disclose information sufficiently permitting
18 an ordinary person to identify a specific individual’s website activity, including
19 what webpages they visit, what items they view and purchase, and their “guest
20 information.”

21 **D. Defendants’ Tracking Tools Disseminate Customer Information**
22 **to Google**

23 94. Plaintiff’s counsels’ investigation revealed that Defendants were also
24 sending their customers’ protected health information to Google via Google
25 tracking tools including Google Analytics and Google Tag Manager.

95. Google Tracking Tools installed on the Web Properties appear to collect the same types and categories of sensitive Private Information from Defendants' customers as the Facebook Pixel:



▼Query String Parameters view source view URL-encoded

random: 1722576484991

cv: 11

fst: 1722576484991

bg: fffffff

guid: ON

async: 1

gtm: 45be47v0v9138828916za200

gcd: 1313131311

dma: 0

tag_exp: 95250752

u_w: 1600

u_h: 1067

url: https://bookings.travelclick.com/104015?_ga=2.175004458.967491335.1722576452-1889482986.1722576452&Adults=1&DateIn=08/02/2024&DateOut=08/03/2024&domain=www.godfreyhotelhollywood.com&hotelId=104015&languageid=1&Rooms=1

ref: https://www.godfreyhotelhollywood.com/

hn: www.googleadservices.com

frm: 0

tiba: The Godfrey Hotel Hollywood

96. The image above demonstrates that Google Analytics similarly shares the name of the destination, the number of residents, the number of rooms, and the dates of stay.

97. As described *supra*, this information is shared with Google along with the CID, __ga and _gid cookies.

98. Defendants do not disclose that the Pixel, Google trackers, first-party cookies from third parties like Facebook and/or Google, or any other Tracking Tools embedded in the Web Properties' source code track, record, and transmit Plaintiff's and Class Members' Private Information to Facebook and Google for targeted advertising. Moreover, Defendants never received consent or written

1 authorization to disclose Plaintiff's and Class Members' private communications to
2 Facebook or Google for marketing.

3 99. Information sent to Google was sent alongside the Plaintiff's and
4 Class Members' unique identifier ("_ga" or "CID" cookies), thereby allowing
5 individual customers' communications with Defendants, and the Private
6 Information contained in those communications, to be linked to their unique
7 Google accounts and therefore their identity.⁵²

8 100. Google logs a user's browsing activities on non-Google websites and
9 uses this data for serving personalized ads.

10 **E. Defendants Never Received Users' Consent to Disclose their**
11 **Confidential Communications**

12 101. As enabled by Defendants, the Tracking Tools collect the contents of
13 Californians' communications with the Web Properties using the Facebook Pixel
14 and Google Analytics. These communications include, but are not limited to,
15 "guest information." This is information that is affirmatively entered by users into
16 the Web Properties. This information is not anonymized because Defendants
17 enable Facebook to link users' communications with their Facebook IDs, which
18 reveal their identities. Google likewise uses cookies to link users to their unique
19 Google accounts.

20 102. Crucially, neither Defendants nor Facebook or Google procure prior
21 consent from Californians for Facebook to engage in this wiretapping.

22 103. The Godfrey Hotel Hollywood's "Privacy Policy" states: "We
23 collect no information about you, other than information automatically collected
24 and stored when you visit our site, including: [t]he name of the domain you use to
25 access the Internet (e.g.aol.com, if you are using an American Online Account),

26 ⁵² See *Brown v. Google LLC*, 2023 WL 5029899, at fn. 11, *supra*, note 3 (quoting
27 Google employee deposition testimony explaining how Google tracks user data).

1 [t]he date and time of your visit, [t]he pages you visited, and [t]he address of the
2 web site you came from when you came to visit.”⁵³

3 104. Additionally, its “Privacy Policy” reads: “We use this information
4 for statistical purposes and to help us make our site more useful to visitors. Unless
5 it is specifically stated otherwise, no additional information will be collected
6 about you.”⁵⁴

7 105. But, contrary to the disclosures, Defendants do collect and disclose
8 users’ personal information, including the Facebook ID that identifies the specific
9 user. Defendants do not disclose that they collect and allow Facebook and Google
10 and other third parties to intercept specific guest record information including the
11 dates of the reservation, the number of adults and children, the cost of the room,
12 and the type of room.

13 106. Defendants also disclose that a room has been purchased and the
14 hotel where users are staying—all of which is sensitive personal information that
15 Defendants do not disclose that they collect and do not disclose that they are
16 sharing this guest record information or personal information to third parties such
17 as Facebook and Google.⁵⁵

18 107. As courts across the country have recognized, the identifiers that the
19 Facebook Pixel captures—including the user’s Facebook ID—constitute “directly
20 personal information.” By capturing information anyway, Defendants fail to
21 receive consent from visitors to intercept their communications.

22 108. Likewise, Defendants and Facebook or Google never receive consent
23 from Web Properties users to intercept and collect electronic communications

24 ⁵³ THE GODFREY HOTEL HOLLYWOOD, PRIVACY POLICY,
25 <https://www.godfreyhotelhollywood.com/privacy-policy.html>.

26 ⁵⁴ *Id.*

27 ⁵⁵ The disclosure of the guest record information and the personally identifiable
28 information is substantively different than sharing the page a user visits.

1 containing their sensitive and unlawfully disclosed information. In fact, Facebook
2 expressly warrants the opposite.

3 109. Finally, none of the users agree to be bound by Defendants' privacy
4 policy nor do Defendants obtain consent before disclosing users' personal
5 information.

6 110. When signing up for Facebook, a user assents to three agreements:
7 the Facebook Terms of Service,⁵⁶ the Cookies Policy,⁵⁷ and the Privacy Policy.⁵⁸
8 For California residents, Facebook also publishes a United States Regional
9 Privacy Notice.⁵⁹

10 111. Facebook's Terms of Service begin by stating that "[p]rotecting
11 people's privacy is central to how we've designed our ad system."⁶⁰ The Terms of
12 Service then prohibit anyone from using Facebook's Products in a manner that is
13 "unlawful, misleading, discriminatory or fraudulent[.]"⁶¹

14 112. Specifically, Facebook acknowledges that "[w]e collect and receive
15 information from partners, . . . [and] receive this information whether or not
16 you're logged in or have an account on our Products."⁶²

17 113. Facebook then offers an express representation: "We require partners
18 to have the rights to collect, use and share your information before giving it to
19

20 ⁵⁶ FACEBOOK, TERMS OF SERVICE,
<https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms/update>.

21 ⁵⁷ FACEBOOK, COOKIES & OTHER STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES,
<https://www.facebook.com/policies/cookies/>.

22 ⁵⁸ FACEBOOK, PRIVACY POLICY, <https://www.facebook.com/privacy/policy>.
23 See also <https://mbasic.facebook.com/privacy/policy/printable>.

24 ⁵⁹ FACEBOOK, PRIVACY POLICY, <https://facebook.com/privacy/policy>. See
25 also <https://mbasic.facebook.com/privacy/policy/printable/>.

26 ⁶⁰ FACEBOOK, TERMS OF SERVICE,
<https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms/update>.

27 ⁶¹ *Id.*

28 ⁶² *Id.*

1 us.”⁶³ Facebook also acknowledges collecting “information with special
2 protections[,]” meaning information that “could have special protections under
3 the laws of your jurisdiction[,]” but critically, only sensitive information that
4 users “choose to provide.”⁶⁴

5 114. Facebook’s Cookies Policy ratifies those representations, stating “the
6 Privacy Policy will apply to our processing of the data that we collect via
7 cookies.”⁶⁵

8 115. For California residents, Facebook reiterates that policy: “We require
9 each of these partners to have rights to collect, use, and disclose your information
10 before providing any information to us.”⁶⁶ The United States Regional Privacy
11 Notice also restricts Facebook’s ability to collect “sensitive personal
12 information,” stating they “will only use or disclose it either with your specific
13 consent when required, or as otherwise permitted by law, including CCPA.”⁶⁷

14 116. Facebook’s other representations reinforce these warranties. In its
15 Advertising Policy, Facebook states “[w]e do not use sensitive personal data for
16 ad targeting.”⁶⁸

17 117. And in a blog post titled “About Restricted Meta Business Tools
18 Dats.” Facebook asserts it has “policies around the kinds of information
19 businesses can share with us.”⁶⁹ Facebook does not “want websites or apps

20 ⁶³ *Id.*

21 ⁶⁴ *Id.*

22 ⁶⁵ FACEBOOK, COOKIES & OTHER STORAGE TECHNOLOGIES,
<https://facebook.com/policies/cookies/>.

23 ⁶⁶ FACEBOOK, UNITED STATES REGIONAL PRIVACY NOTICES,
<https://www.facebook.com/privacy/policy/uso/>.

24 ⁶⁷ *Id.*

25 ⁶⁸ FACEBOOK, ADVERTISING POLICY,
<https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/>.

26 ⁶⁹ FACEBOOK, ABOUT RESTRICTED META BUSINESS TOOLS DATA,
27 <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/361948878201809?id=18885272611056>

1 sending us certain restricted information about people.”⁷⁰ Sensitive information
2 includes, among other things, “any information defined as sensitive under
3 applicable laws, regulations and applicable industry guidelines.”⁷¹

4 118. These representations are repeated frequently. Facebook created a
5 “Help Center” to better explain its practices to users.

6 119. In an article titled, “How does Facebook receive information from
7 other businesses and organizations?” Facebook reiterates its promise to “prohibit
8 businesses or organizations from sharing sensitive information with us,” and if
9 Facebook “determine[s] that a business or an organization is violating our terms,
10 we’ll take action against that business or organization.”⁷²

11 120. In another article, titled, “How does Meta work with data
12 providers?” Facebook repeats this promise, stating “[b]usinesses that advertise on
13 Facebook are required to have any necessary rights and permissions to use this
14 information, as outlined in our Custom Audience Terms that businesses must
15 agree to.”⁷³

16 121. A reasonable user who reads Facebook’s terms and representations
17 would understand those terms as requiring Facebook to enforce an advertiser’s
18 compliance with its terms. At a minimum, those terms and representations require
19 Facebook to build safeguards for sensitive information.
20
21

22 5.

23 ⁷⁰ *Id.*

24 ⁷¹ *Id.*

25 ⁷² FACEBOOK, HOW DOES FACEBOOK RECEIVE INFORMATION FROM
26 OTHER BUSINESSES AND ORGAINZATIONS,
<https://www.facebook.com/help/2230503797265156>.

27 ⁷³ HOW DOES META WORK WITH DATA PROVIDERS?,
<https://www.facebook.com/help/494750870625830>.

1 122. No reasonable user would read those terms and representations as
2 permitting Facebook to intentionally intercept electronic communications that it
3 knows the law protects and deems sensitive.

4 123. And no user, reasonable or not, could read those terms as allowing
5 Facebook to aid and abet another party's disclosure of such protected and
6 sensitive information.

7 124. In short, Facebook never receives consent from users to intentionally
8 intercept and monetize electronic communications disclosing sensitive
9 information that the law protects.

10 **TOLLING**

11 125. Any applicable statute of limitations has been tolled by the "delayed
12 discovery" rule.

13 126. Plaintiff did not know (and had no way of knowing) that her Private
14 Information was intercepted and unlawfully disclosed because Defendants kept
15 this information secret.

16 127. Plaintiff only discovered that her Private Information had been
17 disclosed by Defendants in May 2024, when she discussed her experience with
18 Defendants with undersigned counsel.

19 **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS**

20 128. Class Definition: Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), 23(b)(3), and 23(c)(4) of
21 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of
22 herself and other similarly situated individuals (the "California Class"), as
23 defined below.

24 All individuals residing in the State of California whose
25 Guest Record Information was disclosed through the
26 third-party Tracking Tools on Defendants' Web
27 Properties.

1 129. Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the class definition or add sub-
2 classes as necessary prior to filing a motion for class certification.

3 130. The “Class Period” is the time period beginning on the date
4 established by the Court’s determination of any applicable statute of limitations,
5 after consideration of any tolling, concealment, and accrual issues, and ending on
6 the date of entry of judgment.

7 131. Excluded from the Class are Defendants; any affiliate, parent, or
8 subsidiary of Defendants; any entity in which Defendants have a controlling
9 interest; any officer director, or employee of Defendants; any successor or assign
10 of Defendants; anyone employed by counsel in this action; any judge to whom
11 this case is assigned, his or her spouse and immediate family members; and
12 members of the judge’s staff.

13 132. Numerosity/Ascertainability. Members of the Class are so numerous
14 that joinder of all members would be unfeasible and not practicable. The exact
15 number of Class Members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time. However, it is
16 estimated that there are at least thousands of individuals in the Class. The identity
17 of such membership is readily ascertainable from Defendants’ records and non-
18 party Facebook’s and Google’s records.

19 133. Typicality. Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class
20 because Plaintiff used the Web Properties and had her personally identifiable
21 information and protected health information disclosed to Facebook and/or
22 Google without their express written authorization or knowledge. Plaintiff’s
23 claims are based on the same legal theories as the claims of other Class Members.

24 134. Adequacy. Plaintiff is fully prepared to take all necessary steps to
25 represent fairly and adequately the interests of the Class Members. Plaintiff’s
26 interests are coincident with, and not antagonistic to, those of the Class Members.
27 Plaintiff is represented by attorneys with experience in the prosecution of class
28

1 action litigation generally and in the emerging field of digital privacy litigation
2 specifically. Plaintiff's attorneys are committed to vigorously prosecuting this
3 action on behalf of the Class.

4 135. Common Questions of Law and Fact Predominate/Well-Defined
5 Community of Interest. Questions of law and fact common to the Class
6 predominate over questions that may affect only individual Class Members
7 because Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class.
8 Such generally applicable conduct is inherent in Defendants' wrongful conduct.
9 The following questions of law and fact are common to the Class:

- 10 a. Whether and to what extent Defendants had a duty to protect
11 the Plaintiff's and Class Members' guest records;
- 12 b. Whether Defendants had duties not to disclose Plaintiff's and
13 Class Members' information to unauthorized third parties;
- 14 c. Whether Defendants violated its privacy policy by disclosing
15 Plaintiff's and Class Members' information to Facebook,
16 Meta, Google, or other third parties;
- 17 d. Whether Defendants adequately, promptly and accurately
18 informed Plaintiff and Class Members that their Private
19 Information would be disclosed to third parties;
- 20 e. Whether Defendants violated the law by failing to promptly
21 notify Plaintiff and Class Members that their Private
22 Information had been compromised;
- 23 f. Whether Defendants adequately addressed and fixed the
24 practices which permitted the disclosure of patient Private
25 Information;
- 26 g. Whether Defendants knowingly made false representations as
27 to its privacy policy practices;

- h. Whether Defendants knowingly omitted material representations with respect to its data security and/or privacy policy practices;
- i. Whether Defendants' acts and practices violated Plaintiff's and Class Members' privacy rights;
- j. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to actual, consequential or nominal damages as a result of Defendants' wrongful conduct;
- k. Whether Defendants knowingly made false representations as to their data security and/or privacy policy practices;
- l. Whether Defendants knowingly omitted material representations with respect to their data security and/or privacy policy practices;
- m. Whether Plaintiff and Class Members are entitled to damages under CIPA;
- n. Whether Defendants' actions violate Plaintiff's and Class Members' privacy rights as provided by the California Constitution; and
- o. Whether Defendants violated CIPA §§ 631 and 632

136. Superiority. Class action treatment is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. Such treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary duplication of evidence, effort, or expense that numerous individual actions would engender. The benefits of proceeding through the class mechanism, including providing injured persons a method for obtaining redress on claims that could not practicably be pursued individually, substantially outweighs potential difficulties

1 in management of this class action. Plaintiff is unaware of any special difficulty
2 to be encountered in litigating this action that would preclude its maintenance as a
3 class action.

4 **COUNT I**

5 **VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA INVASION OF PRIVACY ACT**
6 **Cal. Penal Code § 631(a)**
7 ***(On behalf of Plaintiff & the California Class)***

8 137. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as
9 if fully set forth herein.

10 138. Plaintiff brings this Count individually and on behalf of the members
11 of the California Class.

12 139. CIPA § 631(a) imposes liability for “distinct and mutually
13 independent patterns of conduct.” *Tavernetti v. Superior Ct.*, 22 Cal. 3d 187, 192-
14 93 (1978). Thus, to establish liability under CIPA § 631(a), a plaintiff need only
15 establish that defendant, “by means of any machine, instrument, contrivance, or in
16 any other manner,” does any of the following:

17 Intentionally taps, or makes an unauthorized connection,
18 whether physically, electronically, acoustically,
19 inductively, or otherwise, with any telegraph or telephone
20 wire, line, cable, or instrument including the wire, line,
21 cable, or instrument of any internal telephonic
22 communication system

23 *Or*

24 Willfully and without the consent of all parties to the
25 communication, or in any unauthorized manner, reads or
26 attempts to read or learn the contents or meaning of any
27 message, report, or communication while the same is in
28 transit or passing over any wire, line or cable or is being
sent from or received at any place within this state,

Or

Uses, or attempts to use, in any manner, or for any
purpose, or to communicate in any way, any information
so obtained

Or

1 Aids, agrees with, employs or conspires with any person
2 or persons to unlawfully do, or permit, or cause to be
done any of the acts or things mentioned above this
section.

3 140. CIPA § 631(a) is not limited to phone lines, but also applies to “new
4 technologies” such as computers, the Internet, and email. *See Matera v. Google*
5 *Inc.*, 2016 WL 8200619, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016) (CIPA applies to “new
6 technologies” and must be construed broadly to effectuate its remedial purpose of
7 protecting privacy); *see also Javier v. Assurance IQ, LLC*, 2022 WL 1744107, at
8 *1 (9th Cir. May 31, 2022) (“Though written in terms of wiretapping, Section
9 631(a) applies to Internet communications.”).

10 141. Facebook’s Business Tools, including but not limited to the
11 Facebook Pixel and the Conversions API, as well as Google’s Analytics and
12 Google Tracking Tools are each a “machine, instrument, contrivance, or ... other
13 manner” used to engage in the prohibited conduct at issue here.

14 142. Facebook and Google are each a “separate legal entity that offers [a]
15 ‘software-as-a-service’ and not merely a passive device.” *Saleh v. Nike, Inc.*, 562
16 F. Supp. 3d 503, 520 (C.D. Cal. 2021).

17 143. Further, Facebook and Google had the capability to use the
18 wiretapped information for its own purposes. Accordingly, Facebook and Google
19 were a third party to any communication between Plaintiff and Class Members,
20 on the one hand, and Defendant, on the other. *Id.* at 521; *see also Javier v.*
21 *Assurance IQ, LLC*, 649 F. Supp. 3d 891, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2023).

22 144. At all relevant times, Facebook and Google willfully and without the
23 consent of all parties to the communication, or in any unauthorized manner, read,
24 attempted to read, and/or learned the contents or meaning of electronic
25 communications of Plaintiff and Class Members, on the one hand, and
26 Defendants, on the other, while the electronic communications were in transit or
27 were being sent from or received at any place within California.
28

1 145. At all relevant times, Facebook and Google read, attempted to read,
2 and/or learned the contents or meaning of the electronic communications of
3 Plaintiff and then used or attempted to use the communications intercepted by its
4 Business Tools to promote and improve its advertising platform, including to
5 send direct targeted advertising to Plaintiff and Class Members.

6 146. At all relevant times, Defendants aided, agreed with, employed,
7 permitted, or otherwise enabled Facebook and Google to wiretap Plaintiff and
8 Class Members using the Business Tools and to accomplish the wrongful conduct
9 at issue here.

10 147. Defendants intercepted and aided Facebook and Google in the
11 interception of “contents” of Plaintiff’s communications in at least the following
12 forms:

- 13 a. The parties to the communications;
- 14 b. Personally identifying information such as customers’ IP addresses,
15 Facebook IDs, Google unique IDs, browser fingerprints, and other
16 unique identifiers;
- 17 c. The hotel where the guest is staying;
- 18 d. The exact dates of that stay;
- 19 e. How many adults and how many children are staying in the room;
- 20 f. The type of room they are staying in;
- 21 g. The cost of the room where they are staying;
- 22 h. The fact that the room was purchased; and
- 23 i. Any other content that Defendants have aided third parties such as
24 Facebook in scraping from webpages or communication forms at
25 Web Properties.

26 148. Plaintiff and Class Members did not provide their prior consent to
27 Facebook and Google’s intentional access, interception, reading, learning,
28

1 recording, collection, and usage of Plaintiff's and Class Members' electronic
2 communications.

3 149. Nor did Plaintiff and Class Members provide their prior consent to
4 Defendants aiding, agreeing with, employing, permitting, or otherwise enabling
5 Facebook's conduct.

6 150. The violation of section 631(a) constitutes an invasion of privacy
7 sufficient to confer Article III standing.

8 151. The wiretapping of Plaintiff and Class Members occurred in
9 California, where Plaintiff and Class Members accessed the Web Properties and
10 where Facebook and Google—as enabled by Defendants—routed Plaintiff's and
11 Class Members' electronic communications its servers.

12 152. Pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 637.2, Plaintiff and Class Members
13 have been injured by Defendants' violations of CIPA § 631(a), and each seeks
14 statutory damages of \$5,000 for each of Defendants' violations of CIPA § 631(a).

15
16 **COUNT II**

17 **VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA INVASION OF PRIVACY AC**
18 **Cal. Penal Code § 632**
19 ***(On behalf of Plaintiff & the California Class)***

20 153. Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the paragraphs above as
21 if fully set forth herein.

22 154. Plaintiff brings this Count individually and on behalf of the members
23 of the California Class.

24 155. CIPA § 632(a) prohibits any entity from:

25 intentionally and without consent of all parties to a
26 confidential communication, uses an electronic
27 amplifying or recording device to eavesdrop upon or
28 record the confidential communication, whether the
communication is carried on among the parties in the
presence of one another or by means of a telegraph, or
other device, except a radio.

1 156. Facebook’s Business Tools, including but not limited to the
2 Facebook Pixel and the Conversions API, are “electronic amplifying or recording
3 device[s].”

4 157. Cal. Civ. Code § 53.5(a) states:

5 [A]n innkeeper, hotelkeeper, motelkeeper, lodginghouse
6 keeper, or owner or operator of an inn, hotel, motel,
7 lodginghouse, or other similar accommodations, or any
8 employee or agent thereof, who offers or accepts
9 payment for rooms, sleeping accommodations, or board
10 and lodging, or other similar accommodation, shall not
disclose, produce, provide, release, transfer, disseminate,
or otherwise communicate, except to a California peace
officer, all or any part of a guest record orally, in writing,
or by electronic or any other means to a third party
without a court-issued subpoena, warrant, or order.

11 158. Per Cal. Civil. Code § 53.5(c):

12 “Guest record” for purposes of this section includes any
13 record that identifies an individual guest, boarder,
14 occupant, lodger, customer, or invitee, including, but not
15 limited to, their name, social security number or other
unique identifying number, date of birth, location of
birth, address, telephone number, driver’s license
number, other official form of identification, credit card
number, or automobile plate number.

16 159. Here, Web Properties users’ communications with Defendants—
17 made while browsing and booking a room at the Godfrey Hotel Hollywood via
18 the Web Properties —contain sensitive and confidential “guest records.” First, the
19 communications include “record[s] that identif[y] an individual[.]” Cal. Civil
20 Code § 53.5(c). Further, the Facebook Pixel compels Web Properties users’
21 browsers to transmit several cookies (including the c_user, datr, fr, and _fbp
22 cookies) containing “unique identifying number[s]” assigned to Web Properties
23 users. Likewise, the Google Tracking Tools installed and configured by
24 Defendants transmitted through cookies (“_ga” or “CID”) Plaintiff’s and Class
25 Members’ unique identifiers, thereby allowing individual patients’
26 communications with Defendants, and the Private Information contained in those
27 communications, to be linked to their unique Google accounts and therefore their
28

1 identity.Cal. Civil Code § 53.5(c). These communications are all “record[s] that
2 identif[y] an individual[.]” Cal. Civil Code § 53.5(c).

3 160. Web Properties users’ communications with Defendants also
4 “identif[y] an individual [as a Godfrey Hotel Hollywood] guest, boarder,
5 occupant, lodger, customer, or invitee[.]” *Id.*

6 161. Facebook and Google intercept Web Properties users’ button clicks
7 selecting the destination to which they wish to travel, the desired dates for their
8 trip, the number of rooms they require, the type of room in which they will
9 staying, and the cost of that room.

10 162. These communications “identif[y] an individual [as a Godfrey Hotel
11 Hollywood guest] guest, boarder, occupant, lodger, customer, or invitee” (Cal.
12 Civil Code § 53.5(c)) because they show that all Web Properties users are
13 “invitees” of The Godfrey Hotel Hollywood—individuals with “express or
14 implied invitation to enter or use [The Godfrey Hotel Hollywood’s] premises”⁷⁴
15 These communications also identify certain Web Properties users (those who
16 complete the booking process) as The Godfrey Hotel Hollywood’s “guests” and
17 “customers.”

18 163. Thus, at all relevant times, Facebook and Google intentionally used
19 their Tracking Tools to eavesdrop upon and record the confidential
20 communications and personal information (including “guest records,” which are
21 confidential, under Cal. Civil Code § 53.5) of Plaintiff and Class Members, on the
22 one hand, and Defendants, on the other.

23 164. Moreover, neither Facebook nor Google is not permitted to obtain
24 such information because it is not a legitimate “third-party service provider,” as
25 defined by Cal. Civil Code § 53.5(f). Facebook and Google are not “an entity
26

27 ⁷⁴ INVITEE, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

1 contracted to provide services outlined in [a] contract [with The Godfrey Hotel
2 Hollywood's] that has no independent right to use or share the data beyond the
3 terms of the contract." Rather, Facebook and Google have the capability to use
4 the information it wiretaps for purposes other than simply providing a recording
5 to Defendants. *See infra* III.A. Therefore, Defendants' conduct here at issue was
6 not permitted by Cal. Civil Code § 53.5(i).

7 165. When communicating with Defendants, Plaintiff and Class Members
8 had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, based on Cal. Civil Code §
9 53.5. Thus, Plaintiff and Class Members did not reasonably expect that anyone
10 other than Defendants would be on the other end of the communication, and that
11 other, third-party entities like Facebook and Google, would intentionally use an
12 electronic amplifying or recording device to eavesdrop upon and record the
13 confidential communications of Plaintiff and Class Members.

14 166. Plaintiff and Class Members did not consent to any of Facebook's or
15 Google's actions. Nor have Plaintiff or Class Members consented to Facebook's
16 or Google's intentional use of an electronic amplifying or recording device to
17 eavesdrop upon and record the confidential communications of Plaintiff and Class
18 Members.

19 167. Pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 637.2, Plaintiff and Class Members
20 have been injured by Defendants' violations of CIPA § 632(a), and each seeks
21 statutory damages of \$5,000 for each of Defendants' violations of CIPA § 632(a).

22 **RELIEF REQUESTED**

23 168. Plaintiff Madeline Dion, individually and on behalf of the proposed
24 California Class, respectfully requests that the Court grant the following relief:

- 25 a. Certification of this action as a class action and appointment of
26 Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel to represent the Class;
27 b. An order enjoining Defendants from engaging in the unlawful
28

practices and illegal acts described herein; and

- c. An order awarding Plaintiff and the Class: (1) actual or statutory damages; (2) punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial; (3) prejudgment interest on all amounts awarded; (4) injunctive relief as the Court may deem proper; (5) reasonable attorney fees and expenses and costs of suit pursuant to the California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5 and/or other applicable law; and (6) such other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff Madeline Dion, on behalf of herself and the proposed Class, demands a trial by jury for all claims asserted herein and so triable.

DATED: August 2, 2024

/s/ Matthew J. Langley
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